“Guests include Todd McCandless, online from the U.S., creator of one of the most prolifically-read formula one blogs on the internet, Formula1blog.com; and in the studio, Mike Doodson, who has worked at the forefront of British motor racing journalism since the late 1960′s. This episode will also include video post-race exclusive interviews with Phil Prew, Senior Race Engineer, Vodafone McLaren Mercedes and Adam Parr, CEO, AT&T Williams.”

Guests:

Todd McCandless – Formula 1 Blog

Mike Doodson – Journalist

Phil Prew – McLaren Senior Race Engineer

Adam Parr – CEO Williams F1 Team

As a supplement to the regularly posted BPR tables, bprf1.com will chart the progress of the BPR POWER rating throughout the season.

The drivers line plots are broken down into graphs displaying: (1) the entire POWER rating range (0-100); (2) POWER ratings denoting possible points scoring performance (75-100); and (3) POWER ratings denoting possible race-winning performance (90-100). A ranking plot is also provided, and is based on the rankings contained in the BPR table following each round.

For the teams line plot, the POWER ratings of both drivers are combined from each round to compose a team rating. A positional ranking plot is provided for the teams as well.

DRIVERS – FULL RANGE (0-100)

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DRIVERS – POSSIBLE POINT SCORERS (75-100)

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DRIVERS – PROBABLE RACE WINNERS (90-100)

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DRIVERS – RANKINGS

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TEAMS – FULL RANGE (0-100)

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TEAMS – RANKINGS

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posted by Trey Blincoe

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Don’t understand what’s going on here? The Blincoe Performance Rating (“BPR”) is a statistical motorsport performance rating system that monitors driver performance during each Formula 1 season. For more information: see this explanation.

posted by Trey Blincoe

“Today’s episode co-incides with the 80th birthday of that great American racing driver, Dan Gurney. Accordingly, we will be welcoming Dan, a 4-time F1 winner, onto the show live from the headquarters of All-American Racers in Santa Ana, California, mainly to say “Happy Birthday” but also to talk about machinery like the 1967 Eagle-Weslake – a car generally considered by F1 enthusiasts world-wide to be the most beautiful of all time – and Dan’s amazing racing life. We’ll also be looking back at the Malaysian Grand Prix and ahead to the UBS Chinese Grand Prix in Shanghai with two other special guests – Sergio Rinland, the ex-Williams, ex-Sauber engineer who also worked for Dan Gurney, and Rob Wilson, the world’s leading driver coach.”

Guests:

Dan Gurney – Former F1, Le Mans, Indy, Nascar driver

Sergio Rinland – Former Benetton, Ferrari, Sauber engineer

Rob Wilson – Pre-eminent driver coach

With the foregoing in mind, I intend to adapt the existing BPR formula to create a prediction model for the 2011 Formula 1 season.  At this stage, the model will incorporate the POWER rating as well as a separate formula based on track-type performances which positively correlate to other rounds.  Including the second calculation is intended to address the simple fact that there are completely different tracks on the Formula 1 calendar which tend to produce different results based on individual car and driver characteristics.  Although it’s relatively obvious that the results of the Monaco Grand Prix are unlikely to reflect the results of say, the Italian Grand Prix at Monza, result relationships amongst other tracks aren’t as obvious.  Therefore, I decided to run a correlation of all the BPR scores for each round on the 2010 Formula 1 calendar to find which events’ results correlate.  Remember that the BPR incorporates a lot of data for all 24 participating drivers at each round and therefore the correlation results should be fairly dependable.

Following that post, I was able to run similar correlation analysis for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 seasons as well.  Armed with four seasons worth of correlation data, I have developed a prediction model utilizing a weighted mean and the historical correlation coefficients between specific tracks on the Formula 1 calendar.  For more on what a weighted mean is, see this explanation; in short, a weighted mean averages a set of numbers based on associated figures which determine the ‘weight’ each number should have in the final average.  Therefore, the BPR prediction model, unlike the BPR POWER rating, accounts for the demonstrated differences between each track on the F1 calendar.  Unlike the POWER rating, the prediction model will not incorporate a Reliability Rating because it is impossible to predict whether a driver will finish the upcoming race.  For this reason, the prediction model only predicts the likely BPR score of a driver if he finishes the race un-delayed.  As the season develops it is possible that changes will be made to the model, including incorporating the Reliability Rating or three-race performance trend featured in the BPR POWER rating.  However, if any changes are made I will be sure to inform you of them.

The BPR Predictor table looks much like the regularly-posted BPR table with just a few exceptions.  The PREDICT column displays the predicted BPR score of each driver for the upcoming round, and the table is sorted based on the PREDICT outputs.  The shades of blue denoting levels of performance are identical to those in the BPR table.  To the immediate right of the PREDICT column are the individual round BPR scores for each entry.  You will notice that the label for each round’s column has a decimal number below it; this decimal is the correlation coefficient for that particular round’s track and the upcoming round as demonstrated over previous seasons.

2011 FIA Formula 1 World Championship – BPR Predictor Rd. 3: Chinese Grand Prix

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posted by Trey Blincoe

THE DATA SET

“Inside the Race” features performance-based analysis of selected races during the Formula 1 season. The data sets utilized for the Inside the Race features are the official timing tables supplied by the FIA.  Typically, only representative race laps are included in the analysis as the focus is primarily on evaluating on-track performance; therefore, laps skewed by pit stops, safety car periods, or significant on-track incidents are generally not included.

QUALIFYING

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• The table above represents the top 10 drivers on the starting grid from left-to-right, with the best sector times, fastest optimal lap, and fastest actual lap displayed from top to bottom for each entry. Bold numbers indicate fastest sector, fastest optimal lap, and fastest actual lap.
• Saturday’s surprise was not that Sebastian Vettel recorded yet another pole position for Red Bull Racing, it was the qualifying pace of McLaren.  For a few brief seconds, it appeared that Lewis Hamilton was going to snatch pole position away from Vettel on a dry track under normal conditions; a feat that hasn’t been accomplished by anyone since last year’s Singapore Grand Prix.  However, Vettel was able to pull out an extra tenth on Hamilton on his final lap and extend his pole streak yet again.  Vettel’s last-lap dash was a blinder, with the young German leaving nothing on the track as represented by his matching fastest actual and optimal lap times.
• Unlike Australia, where Vettel recorded all three fastest sector times, Hamilton pipped the reigning world champion in the final sector; a result of the McLaren package’s straight-line efficiency and the superiority of the Mercedes drivetrain.  But like Australia, Hamilton’s optimal lap time was even closer to Vettel’s pole time than his ultimate fastest lap showed.
• With matching optimal and fastest laps as in Australia, Fernando Alonso wrung everything he could out of his Ferrari 150 Italia, but lost several tenths to the front row in each sector.  Felipe Massa also matched his potential in the sister Ferrari with similar results.  In fact, both Lotus Renaults and Nico Rosberg in his Mercedes matched their optimal and actual lap times as well.  Let’s take a look at the sector differential percentages to better evaluate where Ferrari are lagging behind the front-runners in qualifying:

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• The table above represents the same drivers from the first table and the relative percentage each sector time contributed to their overall gap to the optimal lap time set by Sebastian Vettel.  To help aid the reader’s understanding of each sector’s layout differences, I’ve posted a track map of the Sepang circuit below:

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• As is typically the case in modern Formula 1, Ferrari has admitted that a lack of downforce is the primary culprit for its relatively lack-luster qualifying performances so far this season.  The differential table above supports Ferrari’s position, indicating that Alonso and Massa lost roughly 50% of their time to Vettel in Sepang’s 2nd Sector.  It should come as no surprise that the 2nd Sector contains just about every downforce-dependent corner on the track, stretching from before Turn 4 through Turn 11.
• But Ferrari was not alone in succumbing to the Red Bull RB7′s superiority in Sector 2.  The differential table clearly shows that every other package in the top 10 was outmatched by the RB7′s aero efficiency when Vettel needed it most.  In the case of McLaren, Hamilton’s middle sector amounted to 161% of his gap to pole due to a superior Sector 3 time, and Button lost 66% of his time in Sector 2 as well.
• Although Mercedes is looking to generally add downforce as well, the team has also been struggling with its rear wing and DRS system since the beginning of the season.  Ross Brawn revealed before the Malaysian Grand Prix that the Mercedes DRS system has been resulting in a detachment of airflow from the wing when its deactivated, resulting in loss of rear downforce and likely contributing to Nico Rosberg’s Sector 2 time.  However, as revealed in the first table above, Rosberg also lost close to 6-tenths of a second in the final sector alone; a fact which clearly doesn’t make sense considering the superiority of the Mercedes engine/KERS combination.   Apparently, the Mercedes DRS system was also not activating properly for both Michael Schumacher’s final lap in Q2, and Rosberg’s final lap in Q3.  Therefore, Rosberg’s Sector 3 time provides a clear indication of just how much time can be gained or lost depending on the functionality of each team’s DRS system.
• With each of the 2010 new teams managing to qualify for the Malaysian Grand Prix, I thought it would be worthwhile to take a look at how Team Lotus, Virgin, and HRT are getting along as they embark on their sophomore seasons:

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• I chose to include the times of pole-sitter Vettel, the last two ‘established’ runners of Adrian Sutil and Pastor Maldonado, and the six drivers from each of the 2010 new teams.  The graphs above display the same qualifying time and sector information normally provided for the front-runners.
• Of obvious note was the performance of Team Lotus following a rather disappointing 2010-esque qualifying in Australia.  Team Principal Mike Gascoyne was quick to note in Australia that the Team Lotus chassis was having exceptional difficulty warming its tires and that the team’s performance was not indicative of the strides made over the off-season.  Clearly the warmer conditions in Malaysia helped, as Heikki Kovalainen’s actual fastest lap was only 4-tenths off the time set by Maldonado.  Of particular note was that Kovalainen only lost 3-tenths to Sutil and the Force India package in the downforce-dependent 2nd Sector.  However, Gascoyne tipped off reporters that the team felt Kovalainen could have done even more if not for traffic on his last lap; possibly even enough to get out of Q3.  While initial reactions to such a statement were understandably skeptical, Kovalainen’s optimal lap time without a clear final-lap run was only 1-tenth off of Maldonado’s.  As will be shown later, Team Lotus’ pace in qualifying wasn’t a fluke and translated into a very respectable race for Kovalainen come Sunday.
• While Team Lotus appears to have made the giant leap forward it had promised over the off-season, the same can’t be said for Virgin Racing.  The second-generation Nick Wirth-designed car is clearly not producing the same levels of downforce as its Lotus counterpart, and the team is in danger of even being caught on pace by HRT.  Timo Glock lost 7-tenths of a second to the Kovalainen Lotus in the second sector alone (translating to a whopping 2.5 second differential to Vettel), and one has to wonder whether the all-CFD approach of Wirth Engineering is outmatched by the performance levels required in F1.  In talking about Mercedes’ issues with their DRS system, Ross Brawn revealed just how important wind tunnel testing was to his team figuring out the system and its various compromises.  Clearly, something with the Virgin package is not quite right at the moment, and the team is pinning its future hopes on an update scheduled to arrive in time for the Turkish Grand Prix.

THE RACE

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• The ultimate race contenders encompassing the top 6 finishers are displayed in the first race line plot.  The so-called ‘best of the rest’ are shown as compared to Felipe Massa’s race in the second.
• Following a fairly tame Australian Grand Prix on the unique Albert Park layout, Malaysia and the series’ first visit to a Hermann Tilke-designed track produced what is likely to be the kind of race we can expect to see throughout the rest of the 2011 season.  While creating a much-improved show for spectators; from a strategy point of view, the addition of less-durable Pirelli tires, KERS and the DRS system resulted in a Grand Prix the likes of which we haven’t seen in a long, long time.  I could write a book about all that occurred on Sunday (I welcome any comments on things I did not touch on), so in an effort to limit length, I will try to keep my insights limited to the important stuff.
• Going into the race weekend it was clear to all that the high temperatures and demanding nature of the Sepang circuit would result in at least one more pitstop than in the Australian Grand Prix.  However, the general development of the Malaysian round was quite similar to Australia; the name of the game being to effectively manage the Pirelli tires.  Managing the Pirellis is quickly shaping up to be a game of ‘chicken’, with each team trying to go as long as possible in their first stint before changing over to fresh rubber for the second.  The importance of going as long as possible in the first stint is down to the finite limitations of the Pirellis, in that everyone has referred to the Italian rubber having three distinct phases.  These phases were clearly indicated in the lap time progressions during each driver’s first stint of the Malaysian Grand Prix.  For those who watched the race on television, the Pirelli phases were referred to on the world feed by Vettel’s race engineer, who asked over the radio, “What phase are the tires in Sebastian?”  To which Vettel replied, “Phase one, beginning to enter phase two.”  Several laps later, Vettel made his third and final pitstop.  So just what are these “phases” in the Pirelli tire’s life?  Let’s take a closer look:
  • The first phase is a period of consistent performance that lasts for a variable duration of laps dependent on several factors, including: driving style, car characteristics, and track conditions.  For the majority in the line plot above, this period lasted until around laps 8-9.
  • The second phase is a period of consistent but manageable degradation that occurs over a fairly static 3-5 lap period.  In the race, this phase generally occurred between laps 9-12.  It appears that management of the second phase can be a significant performance differentiator as Button, Massa, and Alonso were able to close the performance gap to race leader Vettel during this period of the first stint.
  • The third phase is what is referred to as the “cliff”, and no amount of effort on the part of teams can stop its effects once it hits.  In the race, the cliff is represented in laps 12-14 just before the first round of pit stops.  The drop-off in lap times for everyone (besides the early-stopping Mark Webber) during this period is extraordinary uniform.
• Once one understands each phase and how the teams try to manage them, understanding the general development of the rest of the race becomes quite simple in spite of the relative confusion on display Sunday.  Just take a quick look at the line plot again for each driver and you will recognize that each stint is an exercise in monitoring what phase the tire is in, with a goal of stopping just at the end of the tire’s second phase before reaching the cliff.
• Before evaluating any further, let’s take a look at the stint bar graph for those who finished on the lead lap, in finishing order, with the lighter shade of blue once again indicating a stint on the soft option tire and the darker blue denoting a stint on the hard prime tire:

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• As in Australia, the leading philosophy employed by teams was to run the option tire as much as possible, saving a single stint on the prime tire for the end of the race.  The definitive shelf-life of the Pirelli tire made each stint a game of chicken, as alluded to earlier.  In order to not run into the problem that will be further explained in relation to Hamilton’s race, each stint had to be extended as long as possible so as to avoid a fourth stop at the end of the race.  The only notable exceptions to that trend were Webber, who finished 4th, and Hamilton, who crossed the line in 7th but was later demoted to 8th following a post-race penalty.  Both drivers opted for a four-stop, option-option-option-prime-prime strategy; but let’s make clear that Webber’s four-stopper was the only true strategic decision between the two.  To help illustrate Webber’s strategy I have plotted polynomial trend lines to better show the pace progression of the top 6 finishers:

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• Webber fell from 3rd on the grid to 9th at the end of the first lap due to his KERS failing to discharge.  With a car that was already low on top-speed as a result of the RB7′s abundance of downforce, Webber’s lack of KERS would make it nearly impossible to pass on-track during the rest of the race; a fact that was exhibited by his inability to get around Kamui Kobayashi’s Sauber in the opening laps.  In response, Webber and his engineer made the decision to switch to a four-stop strategy to maximize outright performance, effectively using each set of Pirelli’s only for the their first phase.  As shown in the plot above, Webber parlayed his extra stop into being the fastest runner during the middle and final phases of the race.  The strategy worked to perfection, with Webber able to crawl his way back through the field to finish 4th just behind Heidfeld’s Lotus Renault.

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• On the other side of the coin was Hamilton’s dramatic fall from a strong 2nd place position to crossing the line in 7th.  The plot above represents Hamilton’s race to that of teammate Button, who eventually finished in 2nd.  While many have second-guessed McLaren’s strategy calls on Sunday, others have indicated that Hamilton’s race was really compromised back on Saturday when he flat-spotted a set of option tires.  Not having a third set of options for the race meant that Hamilton had to adopt the prime tire at his second stop.  However, it’s notable that Hamilton’s pace on the prime tire during his third stint matched that of Button on the options.  In fact, what’s even more interesting is the near-identical pace and phase progression of Hamilton on the prime and Button on the option during the third stint.  As is visible in the plot above, where Hamilton’s fate was sealed was actually during his fourth stint on his second set of prime tires.  What initially doesn’t make sense is that Hamilton was around a full second a lap slower than Button during this stint, even though Button was also on prime tires.  There are two probable explanations for this phenomenon, the first being that Hamilton had previously used his second set of primes on Saturday and his tires were more worn.   The other explanation is that Button was just quicker on the prime tire, an explanation that is largely attributed to Button’s post-race comments about his car “coming alive” on the primes once he learned how to manage the tire over the course of his final stint. *

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• Kamui Kobayashi replicated teammate Sergio Perez’s Australian strategy of stopping once less than the rest of the top 10 runners on his way to a 7th place finish.  The plot above shows Kobayashi’s race as compared to that of Felipe Massa, who was effectively the slowest of the leading three-stoppers.  Polynomial trend lines have been added to demonstrate the general pace trend for each driver.  Kobayashi’s race confirmed that the Sauber is indeed comparatively easy on its tires, with the young Japanese driver coaxing his tires through the Pirelli’s second phase longer than others in the field.

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• Box plots are provided per the usual; the upper and lower ‘T’ lines on a box plot show minimum and maximum lap-times. The upper and lower reaches of the bars show the first and third quartiles of the lap-time data set (or in other words a 25-75% range), while the center ‘+’ denotes mean lap-time.
• The box plots are supplementary to what has already been discussed above, and should provide the reader with a visualization of each driver’s effective operating range.  The first set of box plots displays the front-runners and the second encompasses the mid-field pack.

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• Finally, I’ll wrap up this version of Inside the Race with a look at the race pace of the new teams in the same vein as I did for the 2010 Malaysian Grand Prix.  For the 2011 edition of the race, I plotted Kovalainen and Glock’s race line plots against those of Jaime Alguersuari and Nico Rosberg.  As compared to a similar line plot from 2010, it’s evident that both Team Lotus and Virgin have made significant strides since this time last last year.  While Kovalainen and Team Lotus had much to be proud of on Sunday evening, one has to wonder just how much the ill-fated two stop strategy employed by Toro Rosso contributed to Kovailanen breathing down Alguersuari’s neck as the checkered flag fell.

posted by Trey Blincoe

* Post-race reports have confirmed that Hamilton was indeed on a set of previously-used hard tires for his fourth stint.

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Don’t understand what’s going on here? The Blincoe Performance Rating (“BPR”) is a statistical motorsport performance rating system that monitors driver/entry performance during each Formula 1 season. For more information: see this explanation.

posted by Trey Blincoe

“Peter and special guests – Sally and Ed Swart, Rob Wilson, plus a recorded interview by Frank Matich – discuss the shining light that was double World Champion, Jim Clark. The 43rd anniversary of his death will be this Thursday, April 7th and we hope, with the addition of dozens of photos, that you will thoroughly enjoy this walk down memory lane.”

Guests:

Sally and Ed Swart

Rob Wilson

Fank Matich (Pre-recorded Interview)

“The Australian Grand Prix had no shortage of topics that were looked into. The Flying Lap was pleased to have F1 tech analyst from the blog ScarbsF1, Craig Scarborough, as the in-studio guest. Craig has appeared before and is a wealth of knowledge in all things technical.”

Guests:

Craig Scarborough – Scarbs F1 Blog

Dominic Harlow – Force India, Chief Race & Test Engineer

Martin Whitmarsh – McLaren Team Principal (Pre-recorded Interview)

Pastor Maldonado – Williams driver (Pre-recorded Interview)

THE DATA SET

“Inside the Race” features performance-based analysis of selected races during the Formula 1 season. The data sets utilized for the Inside the Race features are the official timing tables supplied by the FIA.  Typically, only representative race laps are included in the analysis as the focus is primarily on evaluating on-track performance; therefore, laps skewed by pit stops, safety car periods, or significant on-track incidents are generally not included.

QUALIFYING

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• The table above represents the top 8 drivers on the starting grid from left-to-right, with the best sector times, fastest optimal lap, and fastest actual lap displayed from top to bottom for each entry. Bold numbers indicate fastest sector, fastest optimal lap, and fastest actual lap.
• Sebastian Vettel’s dominance on Saturday is clearly evident from the fact that he recorded all 3 fastest sectors for the fastest optimal lap time, as well as the fastest actual qualifying lap.
• Lewis Hamilton’s optimal lap time was actually quite closer to the pace set by Vettel than otherwise shown by his fastest actual qualifying lap, which should serve as further encouragement for McLaren following a lackluster showing in pre-season testing.
• On the other end of the spectrum, Ferrari and Fernando Alonso’s qualifying performance was decidedly less impressive than predicted.  Of particular concern for Ferrari should be the fact that Alonso’s fastest actual qualifying lap was also his optimal lap time; signifying that the Spaniard left nothing on the track that could account for the gap to rivals Red Bull and McLaren.  In the near term, the Prancing Horse is hoping that their subdued performance in Australia was track and condition-specific.

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• The table above represents the same top 8 qualifying drivers and the relative percentage each sector time contributed to their overall gap to the optimal lap time set by Sebastian Vettel.  To help aid the reader’s understanding of each sector’s layout differences, I’ve posted a track map of the Albert Park circuit below:

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• Clearly, Vettel and the Red Bull RB7 held a massive comparative advantage in the final Sector; accounting for anywhere between 56-72% of Vettel’s full lap advantage over rivals from other teams.  While it may not be entirely obvious based on the track map above, many observers, including McLaren team principal Martin Whitmarsh, noted that Sector 3 at Albert Park is the most downforce-dependent sector of the three.  For the past two seasons its been clear that Adrian Newey’s designs have been the downforce leaders in the field, and as the 2011 season begins, it appears that nothing has changed in that department.  Look out for Red Bull at the next round in Malaysia, as aero grip is at an especially high premium there (when there’s not a monsoon to contend with).
• A talking point in Australia was Mark Webber’s consistent lack of comparative pace to teammate Vettel in both qualifying and the race.  From the differential table above, Webber lost the vast majority of time over 2/3 of the lap; which is very atypical for past comparisons between the dueling Red Bull teammates.  As will be shown later, Webber also suffered from tire degradation in the race far and above the levels experienced by Vettel.  At the weekend’s conclusion, Webber informed the media that he pulled off the track immediately upon crossing the finish line as a precautionary measure because he felt something was just not right with his chassis.  Red Bull confirmed it would be conducting a full strip-down of Webber’s car, and there are unconfirmed reports that the team has already found a mechanical issue that was the culprit of Webber’s problems in Australia.  Point of all this being that its far too soon to write Webber off as a non-contender to Vettel.*
• One last piece of insight to be gleaned from the differential table is the inference that can be drawn from the percentage gaps of Alonso, Felipe Massa, and Nico Rosberg in Sectors 1 and 3.  It was fairly evident to many observers and partially confirmed by both teams that Ferrari and Mercedes struggled with correctly setting-up the new Pirelli tires.  To be sure, many people, including Pirelli themselves, were surprised by the performance characteristics of the new Italian rubber in Melbourne.  However, it appeared that in the two Sectors requiring the best corner-exit traction, Ferrari and Mercedes were particularly slow.

THE RACE

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• The top five finishers are represented in the first line plot, while finishers 6-10 are displayed in the second.  The line plots are fairly self-explanatory in terms of displaying lap time developments over the course of the race, but here are a few insights worthy of note:
  • Hamilton was able to match Vettel’s pace through the majority of the first two stints, and only began to fall back from Vettel after damaging his car’s undertray on lap 28.  One can understand McLaren’s post-race confidence that they can catch Red Bull in race conditions based on the fact that the ultimate gap between Hamilton and Vettel was the product of Hamilton losing periodic chunks of time in the second half of the race; presumably due to the British driver nursing a damaged car.  However, it remains to be seen just how hard Vettel was pushing during the race.
  • Lotus Renault’s Vitaly Petrov put in an impressive podium performance following a difficult rookie campaign, and it appears that the Renault package is on-pace with the offerings from Red Bull, McLaren, and Ferrari at the start of the 2011 season.  From the line plot, Petrov was clearly in cruise mode during the first half of the race after finding himself in an uncontested third position, and therefore his times were not that impressive.   However, as the three-stopping Alonso and Webber began to close in on Petrov during the final third of the race, the Russian driver, on older rubber none-the-less, was able to match the pace of those behind and even run faster than Vettel and Hamilton ahead.
  • The Jenson Button/Felipe Massa scrap during the first stint of the race, resulting in Button being assessed a drive-through penalty, masked Button’s true pace in comparison to the leaders ahead.  Button’s line plot shows that his times were also the most consistent, only adding to the theory that Button’s smooth and controlled driving style is especially easy on his tires.  With the premium placed on tire management in 2011, Button could be a man to watch as the season progresses.
  • Although it was clear the team had a relatively strong package in pre-season testing, Sauber’s performance in Australia was truly impressive; regardless of the team’s eventual disqualification from the race results for a rear-wing technical infringement.  Of particular note in the line plot is Sergio Perez’s outright pace following his one and only stop for the softer option tire.  Perez was able to match the pace of Button on two sets of tires, a fact that nobody, not even Sauber or Pirelli, can truly understand.
• More importantly for upcoming races, both line plots show what will likely be the general pace progression of races and individual stints for the remainder of the 2011 season.  A graph depicting stint lengths and tire selections of the top finishing drivers, in order, is provided below with the lighter shade of blue denoting a stint with the softer ‘option’ tire and the darker blue denoting a stint with the harder ‘prime’ tire:

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• Although the performance characteristics of the Pirelli control tire are bound to change from race-to-race as F1 visits different tracks and the Italian manufacturer develops its compounds and constructions, there is much to be gleaned from the stint chart when viewed in conjunction with the line plots above.
• Unchanged from last season is the fact that fuel burn-off continues to dictate overall pace and tire compound selection in the no-refueling era.  During the 2010 season, teams learned that the effects of fuel weight destroyed either available compound of tire during the first 1/4 of every race.  As such, teams were in the general habit of starting races on the option tire before switching to the prime somewhere past the 1/4 distance, at which point the prime tire could effectively last the remaining distance.  It appears that the same general thought-process will win-out in 2011 with the Pirelli tire, although the actual execution will be somewhat different due to the addition of at least one more stop per race.  Most telling of the prime tire’s continued inability to withstand the effects of fuel weight was Mark Webber’s adoption of the prime tire at his first stop on lap 11, only to stop again for fresh rubber 15 laps later.  To further illustrate the point, below is a line plot comparing the two-stop, option-option-prime strategy of Vettel to the three stop, option-prime-option-option strategy of Webber.  Polynomial trend lines were also added to better show that the performance trend differences were ultimately a push between the two strategies, which put Webber at a substantial disadvantage due to the added time of an extra pit-stop:

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• 2010 featured the odd-exception to the aforementioned general consensus on tire strategy, and such an exception was on display in 2011′s first race.  As previously mentioned, Sauber’s Sergio Perez was able to parlay a one-stop, prime-soft strategy into a remarkable 7th place finish in his debut F1 grand prix.  The line plot below compares Perez’s race to that of teammate Kamui Kobayashi, who employed the standard two-stop, option-option-prime strategy.  Once again, polynomial trend lines were added to show that the performance trends between the two strategies were essentially equal, despite Perez gaining significant track time from making one less pit-stop:

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• Most surprising is Perez’s raw speed on his worn soft tires during the last 1/3 of the race distance.  While there was conjecture in the paddock after the race that the Sauber is particularly easy on its tires, that fact alone cannot fully explain the unexpected success of Perez’s one-stop strategy.   To further illustrate, the line plot below compares Perez’s 2011 race to the one-stop performance of Jenson Button on a drying track at last year’s Australian Grand Prix.  Remember again that Perez’s final stint is on the 2011 Pirelli option tire while Button’s times were set on the ultra-durable Bridgestone prime tire:

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• In a final Perez-related note, the inferences to be drawn by comparing the two Sauber teammates’ races are surely tantalizing for mid-field teams that don’t make it to Q3 and can thereby elect to start on the prime tire.  It will be quite interesting to see whether others attempt to replicate Perez’s Australian Grand Prix strategy in the upcoming races.
• The outright performance of the Pirelli tire also caught everyone off-guard in Australia, including Pirelli.  In qualifying for the Australian Grand Prix, the Pirelli tire produced times that were on par with those set on Bridgestones in 2010, despite the fact that the Pirellis had proven to be at least 1-2 seconds slower than the Bridgestones in pre-season testing.  That trend continued to the race, as shown below by comparing the line plots of Jenson Button and Lewis Hamilton’s 2010 races to those of Sebastian Vettel and Fernando Alonso in 2011:

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• One last analysis tool, box plots, are provided below.  The best way to think of a box plot is as a depiction of a driver’s effective operating range.  Each box plot displays several pieces of information: the upper and lower ‘T’ lines show the minimum and maximum lap-times; the upper and lower reaches of the bars show the first and third quartiles of the lap-time data set (or in other words a 25-75% range); and the center ‘+’ denotes mean lap-time:

(click to enlarge)

(click to enlarge)

• In the first box plot, the front-runners are displayed in finishing order from left to right, and the midfield is displayed in the same order in the second plot.  The information displayed should be fairly self-explanatory; however, keep in mind the effects of a third pit-stop for fresh tires when comparing Alonso and Webber’s times to the others in the front-running group.

posted by Trey Blincoe

* Update: In a news report posted by Autosport on April 4th, Red Bull Racing team principal Christian Horner confirmed that his team had conducted a strip-down of Mark Webber’s chassis following the Australian Grand Prix.  No outright mechanical defects were uncovered, but several “setup” issues were found which Horner believes could have contributed to Webber’s lack of comparative pace and excessive tire wear.